



Security (JRA3)

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Introduction - JRA3 Objectives

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

- Enable secure operation of a European Grid infrastructure.
 - Develop security architectures frameworks and policies.
 - Includes requirements cycle,
 - definition of incident response methods and
 - authentication policies.
- Consistent design of security mechanisms for all core Grid services.
 - Meet production needs of resource providers with regard to identity integrity and protection.
- Provide robust, supportable security components
 - Select, re-engineer, integrate identified Grid Services
- Selection of security components based on requirements of
 - The Middleware developer's
 - The Applications
 - The Operations
- Support and evolve the middleware components (as part of JRA1)



Introduction - Achievements, Issues and Mitigation

Major achievements for this past period

Producing a **Global Security Architecture** document (DJRA3.1), well received from the community and a **Site Access Control Architecture** document (DJRA3.2). A number of **security modules**, of which four will be added to the first release candidate.

Major issues and mitigation

- Geographically distributed teams:
 - Need to improve the handing over of security modules to the middleware developers. More traveling for the JRA3 members.
 - Improve further contact with NA4, applications: The Middleware Security Group (MWSG, chaired by JRA3) has been the meeting point so far. Need more.
- Conflicting/challenging security requirements from applications
 - Connectivity. Mitigation: Dynamic Connectivity Service
 - Sites: 'worker nodes' shall have no global connectivity
 - Apps: 'worker nodes' must have full connectivity
 - Identity anonymity vs. identity traceability. Mitigation: Pseudonymity Service




Architecture - Baseline assumptions

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Security Architecture - Modular, Agnostic, Standard, Interoperable

- Modular add new modules later
- Agnostic modules will evolve
- Standard start with transport-level security but intend to move to message-lever security when it matures
- Interoperable at least for AuthN & AuthZ

 Applied to Web-services hosted in containers and applications (Apache Axis & Tomcat) as
 additional modules



user space

Resource

Sand-

boxing



Architecture - Baseline assumptions

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Security Requirements - Horizontal activity, managed through central groups

- Lesson learned: reused and updated requirements from earlier projects
- Collecting (continuous process) the requirements from the activities - Middleware, Sites, Applications.
- Share the requirements with other grid activities and get feedback, e.g. in the US
- Prioritization set in the security groups, with representatives from all involved activities.
- Defining what security modules to deliver when.



Architecture - Authentication

EUGridPMA

European Grid Authentication Policy Management Authority for e-Science



- Now a <u>Global</u> federation of grid identity providers, based on EUGridPMA requirement the <u>International Grid Federation</u> (IGF)
- EUGridPMA was the driving example for similar groups in Asian-Pacific and the Americas
- Coverage of Europe almost complete
 - 30 accredited members
 - 7 non-EU countries + 1 treaty organization
- Initiative strongly encouraged by e-IRG








Architecture - Authentication

- Managed credential storage
 - i.e., where access policy can be enforced
 - "Active" Certificate stores (smart cards, MyProxy)
 - Organizationally rooted trust (KCA, SIPS)
 - Password-scrambled files should go away

Better certificate revocation technologies needed





Architecture - TLS vs MLS

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Transport Level Security

- Uses widely deployed TLS/SSL protocol
- However provide security between communicating host only

Message Level Security


- Uses Web Services or SOAP messages security technology
- Recommended by WS-I Consortium as preferable WS-Security solution
- Performance and support issues

So, TLS for now

- SOAP over HTTPS with proxy cert supported path validation
- WS interface for delegation

Integrate MLS as we go along

Use cases for MLS exist already (DM)





Plans and status - Services

Overview of the security architecture services (1/3)

Service	Description	Time frame
Logging and Auditing	Ensures monitoring of system activities, and accountability in case of a security event	Now
Authentication	Credential storage ensures proper security of (user-held) credentials	Now
	Proxy certificates enable single sign-on TLS, GSI, WS-Security and possibly other X.509 based transport or message-level security protocols ensure integrity, authenticity and (optionally) confidentiality	Now Now
	EU GridPMA establishes a common set of trust anchor for the authentication infrastructure	Now
	Pseudonymity services addresses anonymity and privacy concerns	Mid-term



Plans and status - Services

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Overview of the security architecture services (2/3)

Service	Description	Time frame
Authorization	Attribute authorities enable VO managed access control	Now
	Policy assertion services enable the consolidation and central administration of common policy	Future Now
	Authorization framework enables for local collection, arbitration, customisation and reasoning of policies from different administrative domains, as well as integration with service containers and legacy services	INOW
Delegation	Allows for an entity (user or resource) to empower another entity (local or remote) with the necessary permissions to act on its behalf	Now



Plans and status - Services

Overview of the security architecture services (3/3)

Service	Description	Time frame	
Data key management	Enables long-term distributed storage of data for applications with privacy or confidentiality concerns	Mid-term	
Sandboxing	Isolates a resource from the local site infrastructure hosting the resource, mitigating attacks and malicious/wrongful use	Mid-term	
Dynamic Connectivity Service	Enables applications to communicate despite heterogenous and non-transparent network access	Mid-term	



Plans and status - Requirements

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High-level requirements and how the architecture address them


Requirement	Fulfilled	Solution/Technology/Service	Time frame
Single sign-on	Yes	Proxy certificates and a global authentication infrastructure	Now
User Privacy	Partially	Pseudonymity services	Mid-term
Data Privacy	Partially	Encrypted data storage	Mid-term
Audit ability	Partially	Meaningful log information	Now
Accountability	Yes	All system interactions can be traced back to a user	Now
VO managed access control	Yes	VOMS	Now
Support for legacy and non- WS based software components	Yes	Modular authentication and authorization software suitable for integration	Now
Timely revocation delays	Yes	Gradual transition from CRL based revocation to OCSP based revocation	Mid-term
Non-homogenous network access	Yes	Dynamic Connectivity Service	Future



Business Applications - "Anonymity"

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- Issue: Identity anonymity vs. identity traceability
- Proposed solution: Pseudonymity





Business Applications - Network Access


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Issue: Conflicting requirements

- Sites: 'worker nodes' shall have no global connectivity
- Apps: 'worker nodes' must have full connectivity

Proposed solution, security-wise (JRA3):

- 'Dynamic Connectivity Service' (DCS)
- Policy-controlled connections to the outside world
- Same fine-grained access control via VOMS
- Grid service interface
- Compliant to work in JRA4





Integration and development

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- JRA3 is, from start of the project, part of the JRA1 development - as the Nordic Cluster.
- All software development at JRA3 follows the processes of JRA1.
- See previous presentation from JRA1.



Module candidates for Release candidate 1 (RC1):

SOAP over HTTPS

This implements transport layer security for web services.

Authorization framework

A java rendering of the pluggable authorization framework

VOMS support for authorization

 The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) is used for managing the membership to VOs and as attribute authority.

Resource Access Control (LCAS, LCMAPS, gatekeeper)

 Resource access control is based on LCAS and LCMAPS. The globus WorkSpace Service (WSS) is used for account management.

Plans and status - RC1.x, RC2

- Ready for later releases of RC1:
 - Message level security
 - Delegation
 - Grid enhancements for OpenSSL (part of 097/098, i.e. the Feb/March release of OpenSSL)
 - Dynamic Connectivity Service (work ongoing)
- New release plan to be presented at next MWSG, Feb 23-24
- JRA3 has also contributed in:
 - WorkSpace Service (WSS) a EGEE and Globus collaboration
 - Coordinating and collaborating with JRA1 security work (VOMS)
 - LCG security work (VOMS Admin)



Plans and status - Next 9 months

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- PM10-12 gLite Release 1
- PM12 First revision of the Security operational procedures document
- PM12 Document describing the framework for policy evalutation expected to be accepted in GridPMA policies and determination of the CA service authorities for EGEE.
- By PM12 all EU memberstates active in Grid projects will have a national accredited Authority.
- PM16 Global Security Architecture document is revised, with input from operations, applications, and external collaborating infrastructure projects. The revised architecture will be used to help drive the work on security software modules that will be included in the 2nd major release of gLite.
- PM18 Second revision of the Security operational procedures document.
- PM18 A documented assessment of the work and experience gathered with the basic accounting infrastructure already deployed and will highlight what remains to be done to provide a secure, deployable quota allocations and enforcement mechanism.

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Plans and status - A word on collaboration

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Next period:

- JRA3 will work with GGF to define and prototype a WS proposals and standards based delegation method.
- All general security aspects will be performed in collaboration with other grid initiatives such as DEISA, OSG, Diligent, NextGrid, CoreGrid, eIRG, TC-EMC2, TF-CSIRT, the Baltic states and Asian collaborators.



Top 3 achievements so far:

- Security architecture in place, minor revisions expected during the following 9 months.
- Significant contribution to EUGridPMA (chair) and standardization work (co-chair of GGF Security).
- Security components to gLite: continuous work. 4 modules in release candidate 1.0.

Major Issues:

- Geographically distributed teams
- Conflicting/challenging security requirements from applications



Questions and answers

Questions about the activity: Ake Edlund

Technical questions: David Groep