

Security on Grid:

Emidio Giorgio INFN – Catania EGEE Tutorial, Rome, 2 November 2005







www.eu-egee.org

INFSO-RI-508833



- Glossary
- Encryption
 - Symmetric algorithms
 - Asymmetric algorithms: PKI
- Certificates
 - Digital Signatures
 - X509 certificates
- Grid Security
 - Basic concepts
 - Grid Security Infrastructure
 - Proxy certificates
 - Command line interfaces
- Virtual Organisation
 - Concept of VO and authorization
 - VOMS, LCAS, LCMAPS



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Glossary


- Principal
 - An entity: a user, a program, or a machine
- Credentials
 - Some data providing a proof of identity
- Authentication
 - Verify the identity of a principal
- Authorization
 - Map an entity to some set of privileges
- Confidentiality
 - Encrypt the message so that only the recipient can understand it
- Integrity
 - Ensure that the message has not been altered in the transmission
- Non-repudiation
 - Impossibility of denying the authenticity of a digital signature



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
- Mathematical algorithms that provide important building blocks for the implementation of a security infrastructure
- Symbology
 - Plaintext: M
 - Cyphertext: C
 - Encryption with key $K_1 : E_{K_1}(M) = C$
 - Decryption with key K_2 : $D_{K_2}(C) = M$
- Algorithms
 - Symmetric: $K_1 = K_2$
 - Asymmetric: $K_1 \neq K_2$



Symmetric Algoritms

• The same key is used for encryption and decryption

- Advantages:
 - Fast
- Disadvantages:
 - how to distribute the keys?
 - the number of keys is $O(n^2)$
- Examples:
 - DES
 - 3DES
 - Rijndael (AES)
 - Blowfish
 - Kerberos






- Every user has two keys: one private and one public:
 - it is *impossible* to derive the private key from the public one;


Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

- a message encrypted by one key can be decrypted only by the other one.
- No exchange of secrets is necessary
 - the sender cyphers using the public key of the receiver;
 - the receiver decrypts using his private key;
 - the number of keys is O(n).
- Examples:

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- Diffie-Helmann (1977)
- **RSA** (1978)







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- Functions (*H*) that given as input a variable-length message (*M*) produce as output a string of fixed length (*h*)
 - the length of *h* must be at least 128 bits (to avoid *birthday attacks*)
 - 1. given *M*, it **must be easy** to calculate H(M) = h
 - 2. given *h*, it **must be difficult** to calculate $M = H^{-1}(h)$
 - 3. given *M*, it **must be difficult** to find *M*' such that H(M) = H(M')
- Examples:
 - SNEFRU: hash of 128 or 256 bits;
 - MD4/MD5: hash of 128 bits;
 - SHA (Standard FIPS): hash of 160 bits.

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Digital Signature

 Paul calculates the hash of the message


Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

- Paul encrypts the hash using his private key: the encrypted hash is the <u>digital</u> <u>signature</u>.
- Paul sends the signed message to John.
- John calculates the hash of the message and <u>verifies</u> it with A, decyphered with Paul's public key.
- If hashes equal: message wasn't modified; Paul cannot
 Paul keys

public

private







Digital Certificates

- Paul's digital signature is safe if:
 - 1. Paul's private key is not compromised

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE


- 2. John knows Paul's public key
- How can John be sure that Paul's public key is really Paul's public key and not someone else's?
 - A *third party* guarantees the correspondence between public key and owner's identity.
 - Both A and B must trust this third party

• Two models:

- X.509: hierarchical organization;
- PGP: "web of trust".







- F knows D and E, who knows A and C, who knows A and B.
- F is reasonably sure that the key from A is really from A.






The "third party" is called <u>Certification Authority</u> (CA).

- Issue Digital Certificates for users, programs and machines
- Check the identity and the personal data of the requestor
 Registration Authorities (RAs) do the actual validation
- CA's periodically publish a list of compromised certificates
 - Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL): contain all the revoked certificates yet to expire
- CA certificates are self-signed



X.509 Certificates





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GRID Security: the players

Enabling Grids for E-sciencE

Users

- Large and dynamic population
 Different accounts at different sites
 Personal and confidential data
 Heterogeneous privileges (roles)
- •Desire Single Sign-On

"Groups"

- "Group" data
- Access Patterns
- Membership


- Heterogeneous Resources
- Access Patterns
- Local policies

Sites

Grid

Membership

CALCED THE GRID Security Infrastructure (GSI Enabling Grids for E-science






- Egee/LCG recognizes a given set of CAs
 - https://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/pki_certificates.html
- How do you request a certificate depends on your CA

- For GILDA, have a look at the Video Tutorials:
 - <u>https://gilda.ct.infn.it/video/Certification/Allproxy.html</u> (Flash)
 - <u>https://gilda.ct.infn.it/video/Certification/AllCertproxy.ram</u> (Real)



Certificate Request



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CALCE On the side: certificate management

- Import your certificate in your browser
 - If you received a .pem certificate you need to convert it to PKCS12
 - Use *openssl* command line (available in each egee/LCG UI)
 - openssl pkcs12 -export -in usercert.pem -inkey userkey.pem -out my_cert.p12 -name 'My Name'
- GILDA (and other VOs):
 - You receive already a PKCS12 certificate (can import it directly into the web browser)
 - For future use, you will need usercert.pem and userkey.pem in a directory ~/.globus on your UI
 - Export the PKCS12 cert to a local dir on UI and use again openssl:
 - openssl pkcs12 -nocerts -in my_cert.p12 -out userkey.pem
 - openssl pkcs12 -clcerts -nokeys -in my_cert.p12 -out usercert.pem




X.509 Proxy Certificate

- GSI extension to X.509 Identity Certificates
 - signed by the normal end entity cert (or by another proxy).
- Enables single sign-on
- Support some important features
 - Delegation
 - Mutual authentication
- Has a limited lifetime (minimized risk of "compromised credentials")
- It is created by the grid-proxy-init command:
 - % grid-proxy-init
 - Enter PEM pass phrase: *****
 - Options for grid-proxy-init:
 - -hours <lifetime of credential>
 - -bits <length of key>
 - -help



- User enters pass phrase, which is used to decrypt private key.
- Private key is used to sign a proxy certificate with <u>its own</u>, new public/private key pair.
 - User's private key not exposed after proxy has been signed



- Proxy placed in /tmp
 - the private key of the Proxy is *not* encrypted:
 - stored in local file: must be readable **only** by the owner;
 - proxy lifetime is short (typically 12 h) to minimize security risks.
- NOTE: No network traffic!





• grid-proxy-init ≡ "login to the Grid"

• To "logout" you have to destroy your proxy:

- grid-proxy-destroy
- This does NOT destroy any proxies that were delegated from this proxy.
- You cannot revoke a remote proxy
- Usually create proxies with short lifetimes


• To gather information about your proxy:

- grid-proxy-info
- Options for printing proxy information

-subject	-issuer
-type	-timeleft
-strength	-help



- Delegation = remote creation of a (second level) proxy credential
 - New key pair generated remotely on server
 - Client signs proxy cert and returns it
- Allows remote process to authenticate on behalf of the user
 - Remote process "impersonates" the user
- The client can elect to delegate a "limited proxy"
 - Each service decides whether it will allow authentication with a limited proxy
 - Job manager service requires a full proxy
 - GridFTP server allows either full or limited proxy to be used






Long term proxy

• Proxy has limited lifetime (default is 12 h)

- Bad idea to have longer proxy
- However, a grid task might need to use a proxy for a much longer time
 - Grid jobs in HEP Data Challenges on LCG last up to 2 days
- myproxy server:
 - Allows to create and store a long term proxy certificate:
 - myproxy-init -s <host_name>
 - -s: <host_name> specifies the hostname of the myproxy server
 - myproxy-info
 - Get information about stored long living proxy
 - myproxy-get-delegation
 - Get a new proxy from the MyProxy server
 - myproxy-destroy
 - Chech out the myproxy-xxx - help option
- A dedicated service on the RB can renew automatically the proxy
- File transfer services in gLite validates user request and eventually renew proxies
 - contacting myproxy server

Grid authentication with MyProxy





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Enabling Grids for E-sciencl

- Grid users MUST belong to virtual organizations
 - What we previously called "groups"
 - Sets of users belonging to a collaboration
 - User must sign the usage guidelines for the VO
 - You will be registered in the VO-LDAP server (wait for notification)
 - List of supported vos:
 - https://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/virtual_organization.html

• Vos maintain a list of their members on a LDAP Server

 The list is downloaded by grid machines to map user certificate subjects to local "pool" accounts

...
"/C=CH/O=CERN/OU=GRID/CN=Simone Campana 7461" .dteam
"/C=CH/O=CERN/OU=GRID/CN=Andrea Sciaba 8968" .cms
"/C=CH/O=CERN/OU=GRID/CN=Patricia Mendez Lorenzo-ALICE" .alice
...

Sites decide which vos to accept

/etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile

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VOMS : concepts

• Virtual Organization Membership Service


- Extends the proxy with info on VO membership, group, role and capabilities
- Fully compatible with Globus Toolkit
- Each VO has a database containing group membership, roles and capabilities informations for each user
- User contacts voms server requesting his authorization info
- Server send authorization info to the client, which includes them in a proxy certificate

```
[glite-tutor] /home/giorgio > voms-proxy-init --voms
gildav
Your identity: /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal
Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio
Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it
Enter GRID pass phrase:
Creating temporary proxy ..... Done
Contacting cert-voms-01.cnaf.infn.it:15008
[/C=IT/O=INFN/OU=Host/L=CNAF/CN=cert-voms-01.cnaf.infn.it]
"gildav" Done
Creating proxy ..... Done
Your proxy is valid until Thu Oct 20 05:37:22 2005
```









• Authz DB is a RDBMS (currently MySQL and Oracle are supported).



- short for Fully Qualified Attribute Name, is what VOMS uses to express membership and other authorization info
- Groups membership, roles and capabilities may be expressed in a format that bounds them together <group>/Role=[<role>][/Capability=<capability>]

```
[glite-tutor] /home/giorgio > voms-proxy-info -fqan
/gildav/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
/gildav/staff/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
/gildav/tutors/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
```

- FQAN are included in an Attribute Certificate
- Attribute Certificates are used to bind a set of attributes (like membership, roles, authorization info etc) with an identity
- AC are digitally signed
- VOMS uses AC to include the attributes of a user in a proxy certificate



- Server creates and sign an AC containing the FQAN requested by the user, if applicable
- AC is included by the client in a well-defined, non critical, extension assuring compatibility with GT-based mechanism
- At resources level, authorization info are extracted from the proxy and processed by LCAS and LCMAPS

```
[glite-tutor] /home/giorgio > voms-proxy-info -all
          : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio
subject
Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it/CN=proxy
          : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio
issuer
Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it
identity : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio
Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it
type
          : proxy
strength : 512 bits
          : /tmp/x509up u513
path
timeleft : 11:28:55
          : gildav
VO
subject
          : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio
Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it
issuer
          : /C=IT/O=INFN/OU=Host/L=CNAF/CN=cert-voms-01.cnaf.infn.it
attribute : /gildav/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /gildav/staff/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
attribute : /gildav/tutors/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL
timeleft : 11:28:55
```



LCAS & LCMAPS

- Local Centre Authorization Service (LCAS)
 - Checks if the user is authorized (currently using the grid-mapfile)
 - Checks if the user is banned at the site
 - Checks if at that time the site accepts jobs
- Local Credential Mapping Service (LCMAPS)
 - Maps grid credentials to local credentials (eg. UNIX uid/gid, AFS tokens, etc.)
 - Map also VOMS group and roles (full support of FQAN)

"/VO=cms/GROUP=/cms"	.cms
"/VO=cms/GROUP=/cms/prod"	.cmsprod
"/VO=cms/GROUP=/cms/prod/ROLE=manager"	.cmsprodman



• User certificate files:

- Certificate: X509_USER_CERT (default: \$HOME/.globus/usercert.pem)
- Private key: X509_USER_KEY (default: \$HOME/.globus/userkey.pem)
- Proxy: X509_USER_PROXY (default: /tmp/x509up_u<id>)
- Host certificate files:
 - Certificate X509_HOST_CERT (default: /etc/grid-security/hostcert.pem)
 - Private key X509_HOST_KEY (default: /etc/grid-security/hostkey.pem)
- Trusted certification authority certificates:
 - X509_CERT_DIR (default: /etc/grid-security/certificates)
- Voms server public keys
 - X509_VOMS_DIR (default: /etc/grid-security/vomsdir)



Further Information

Grid

- LCG Security: http://proj-lcg-security.web.cern.ch/proj-lcg-security/
- LCG Registration: http://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/
- Globus Security: http://www.globus.org/security/
- VOMS: http://infnforge.cnaf.infn.it/projects/voms

Background

- GGF Security: http://www.gridforum.org/security/
- IETF PKIX charter: http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html
- PKCS: http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/index.html