Standards and Frameworks

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EGEE Workshop on Management of Rights in Production Grids



Where we stand today
 Essentials in Grid Security
 Federated Grid Authentication
 OGSA AuthZ Model



Three Generation of Grids

Local "metacomputers" Distributed File Systems Site-wide single sign on Metacenters explore interorganizational integration Totally custom-made, top-to-bottom: proofs-of-concept

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Utilize software services and communication protocols developed by Grid projects:

Condor, Globus, Unicore, Legion Need significant customization to deliver complete solution

Interoperability is still very difficult

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Common interface specifications support interoperability of discrete, independently developed services

Competion and interoperability among application, toolkits, and implementations of key services

Standardization is key for 3rd Generation Grids

Essentials

Access to shared resources

- Cross domain authentication, authorization, accounting billing
 - Common generic protocols for collective services
- Support multi user collaborations
 - **Organized in Virtual Organizations**
 - International Grid Trust Federation
- Easy Single Sign On
- Resource owners must always be in control

Virtual vs Organic



AuthN vs AuthZ

Single Authentication Token («Passport»)

- Issued by a trusted IdP
 - Recognised by many RPs, Users and Vos
 - Persistant & traceable
- Per VO Authorizations
 - Granted to a person service via a VO
 - Based on the «passport» name
 - Provides provide access to VO, but still can deny access to individual users

Federation Model for Grid Authentication



A Federation of many independent Cas

- Common minimum requirements
- Trust domain as required by users and relying parties
- No single hierarchy with a single top
 Spread for reliability and failure containtment
 Maximum leverage of national efforts

Building the Federation

Identity Providers ('CAs') and Relying Parties ('sites') together shape the common requirements

- Several profiles for different identity management models
 Authorities testify to comply with profile guidelines
 - Peer review process within the Federation to (re)evaluate members on entry & periodically
- Reduce efforts on the Relying Parties
- Single document to review and assess for all CAs
- Reduce cost on Identity Providers
- No audit statement needed by certified accountants
- But participation in the Federation comes with a price
- Requires that the Federation remains manageable in size

International Grid Trust Federation



Profile: Secured X509 CAs ✓ RFC 3280 and 3820 Certificates: Client - Server authentication Single Sign On **Credential Delegation SSL/TLS** communications One single CA per country, large region or international treaty organization Users have to perform face to face identification with an RA

New things coming in... OCSP ✓1SCP **Audits** Long Lived Credential Services?

But....

 Users do not understand certificates
 They are used to the standard username and password mechanism
 Many organizations have existing directories in place

Profile: Short Lived Credential Services

 Users authenticate by tranditional means to their directory
 The retrieve short lived grid proxies in order to be able to access Grid enabled services



Grid Authorization

Key Elements
 Grid User
 Attribute Authority
 Grid Resource

- Push Model:
 - The Grid User passes it's credential to the Grid Resource
- Pull Model
 - The Resource fetches the user's credential from the AA

OGSA Authorization Group



The request is a set of SAML attribute assertions embedded in a WS-Trust request protocol message

CVS, STS and PIP

WS-Trust enables security token interoperability by defining a request/response SOAP protocol whereby clients can request from some trusted
authority that a particular security token be exchanged for another one

The security token service (STS) is the trusted authority that responds to WS-Trust requests.

CVS, STS and PIP

STS Functionalities
 Security token exchange
 Security token issuing
 Security token validation
 CVS Corresponds to the validation functionality of the STS

CVS, STS and PIP

Policy Information Point (PIP) is the system entity that acts as a source of attribute values.
CVS is a specialized type of PIP that can process credentials and/or security tokens according to a credential validation policy, and that can return valid attributes in exchange for the input credentials.

Virtual Organization Membership Service

 Maintains a database of members and members roles for a specific

Uses Attribute Certificates (RFC 3281)

Follows the Push Model:

- User generates a voms proxy and passes it to the Resource
- The VOMS proxy attribute certificate format hass been submitted to GGF

VOMS Interactions



Vega GOSv2 & GridShield

Employed in CNGrid

 Uses the Agora Service as the front-end for the user management service, the resource management service and the authentication - authorization service.

Vega GOSv2 Interactions







Final Thoughts

More Authentication Service Profiles start to appear (tendency to go to username, password scheme)

- PKI tends to get hidden into the middleware.
- Opens the door for SAML based implementions to interoperate with existing ones
- Credential Translation Services can provide such bridging