



Training Outreach and Education

<http://www.nesc.ac.uk/training>



<http://www.ngs.ac.uk>

Security, Authorisation and Authentication

Mike Mineter, Guy Warner
Training, Outreach and Education
National e-Science Centre
mjm@nesc.ac.uk, gcw@nesc.ac.uk

PPARC

<http://www.pparc.ac.uk/>

eGEE


<http://www.eu-egee.org/>




Policy for re-use

- This presentation can be re-used for academic purposes.
 - However if you do so then please let training-support@nesc.ac.uk know. We need to gather statistics of re-use: no. of events, number of people trained.
- Thank you!!

Security Overview





User

Resource


- How does a user securely access the Resource without having an account with username and password on the machines in between or even on the Resource?
- How does the Resource know who a user is?
- How are rights controlled?

Authentication: how is identity of user/site communicated?

Authorisation: what can a user do?

- **Launch attacks to other sites**
 - Large distributed farms of machines, perfect for launching a Distributed Denial of Service attack.
- **Illegal or inappropriate data distribution and access sensitive information**
 - Massive distributed storage capacity ideal for example, for swapping movies.
 - Growing number of users have data that must be private – biomedical imaging for example
- **Damage caused by viruses, worms etc.**
 - Highly connected infrastructure means worms could spread faster than on the internet in general.

- **Asymmetric encryption...**





- **.... and Digital signatures ...**

- A hash derived from the message and encrypted with the signer's private key
- Signature is checked by decrypting with the signer's public key



- **Are used to build trust**

- That a user / site is who they say they are
- And can be trusted to act in accord with agreed policies

- Every user has two keys: one *private* and one *public*:
 - it is *impossible* to derive the private key from the public one;
 - a message encrypted by one key can be decrypted **only** by the other one.
- Public keys are exchanged
- Concept - simplified version:
 - The sender encrypts using his private key
 - The receiver decrypts using senders public key;
 - The number of keys is $O(n)$



- Paul calculates the *hash* of the message
- Paul encrypts the hash using his *private* key: the encrypted hash is the digital signature.
- Paul sends the signed message to John.
- John calculates the hash of the message
- Decrypts signature, to get A, using Paul's *public* key.
- If hashes equal:
 1. message wasn't modified;
 2. hash A is from Paul's private key




- How can John be sure that Paul's public key is really Paul's public key and not someone else's?
 - A *third party* certifies correspondence between the public key and Paul's identity.
 - Both John and Paul trust this third party

The “third party” is called a Certification Authority (CA).

- **An X.509 Certificate contains:**

- owner's public key; →
- identity of the owner; →
- info on the CA; →
- time of validity; →
- Serial number; →
- Optional extensions →




- digital signature of the CA →

- User's identity has to be certified by one of the national *Certification Authorities (CAs)*
- Resources are also certified by CAs
- CAs are mutually recognized
<http://www.gridpma.org/>,
- CAs each establish a number of people "registration authorities" RAs
- To find RAs in UK go to <http://www.grid-support.ac.uk/ca/ralist.htm>

Based on X.509 PKI:


- every Grid transaction is mutually authenticated:
 1. A sends his certificate;
 2. B verifies signature in A's certificate using CA public certificate;
 3. B sends to A a challenge string;
 4. A encrypts the challenge string with his private key;
 5. A sends encrypted challenge to B
 6. B uses A's public key to decrypt the challenge.
 7. B compares the decrypted string with the original challenge
 8. If they match, B verified A's identity and A can not repudiate it.
 9. Repeat for A to verify B's identity



After A and B authenticated each other,
for A to send a message to B:


- **Default: message integrity checking**
 - Not private – a test for tampering

- **For private communication:**
 - Encrypt all the message (not just hash) - Slower




Grid Security Infrastructure - proxies


- To support delegation: A delegates to B the right to act on behalf of A
- proxy certificates *extend X.509 certificates*
 - Short-lived certificates signed by the user's certificate or a proxy
 - Reduces security risk, enables delegation



Certificate Request



“Compute element”: a batch job queue





User Responsibilities

- Keep your private key secure – *on USB drive only*
- Do not loan your certificate to anyone.
- Report to your local/regional contact if your certificate has been compromised.
- Do not launch a delegation service for longer than your current task needs.


If your certificate or delegated service is used by someone other than you, it cannot be proven that it was not you.

- **Authentication**

- User obtains certificate from Certificate Authority
- Connects to UI by ssh
UI is the user's interface to Grid
- Uploads certificate to UI
- Single logon – to UI - create proxy
- then **Grid Security Infrastructure uses proxies**


- **Authorisation**

- User joins Virtual Organisation
- VO negotiates access to Grid nodes and resources
- Authorisation tested by resource:
Gridmapfile (or similar) maps user to local account





Our setup





The Practical

- You should have been given an information sheet containing your username and password
 1. Login to your workstation
 2. Open a browser window and follow the link from today's agenda page
 3. Click on “further information” for *this* practical.

The Practical

- You should have been given an information sheet containing your username and password
1. Login to your workstation
 2. Open a browser window and follow the link from today's agenda
 3. Click on the “further information” for *this* practical.
 4. Before you follow instructions to use the putty program set it up to use X11 (useful later on).... Next slide

How to start putty to enable x11



1. Run exceed
2. Run putty
3. Set X11 before opening session
4. (kwrite editor available)

A screenshot of the PuTTY Options dialog box. The left sidebar shows a tree view with categories: Session, Terminal, Window, Connection, and SSH. Under SSH, 'Tunnels' is selected and circled in red. The main area is titled 'Options controlling SSH tunnelling'. Under the 'X11 forwarding' section, 'Enable X11 forwarding' is checked and circled in red. The 'display location' is set to 'localhost:0'. Under 'Remote X11 authentication protocol', 'MIT-Magic-Cookie-1' is selected. The 'Port forwarding' section has 'Local ports accept connections from other hosts' and 'Remote ports do the same (SSH v2 only)' both unchecked. There is a 'Remove' button for forwarded ports and an 'Add' button for new forwarded ports. At the bottom are 'About', 'Help', 'Open', and 'Cancel' buttons.



- Open a new session on putty:
- connect to `training-ui.nesc.ed.ac.uk`
 - Accept key when prompted by training-ui